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HEALTH SYSTEMS RESILIENCE 
 
Health Systems Resilience: A Systems Analysis is a 
project which seeks to apply a systems 
dynamics approach to understand, predict and 
identify mechanisms that influence the 
resilience of health systems in contexts of 
adversity. Resilience has emerged as a 
dominant concept underpinning development 
assistance and humanitarian support in 
contexts vulnerable – through conflict or 
natural disaster – to crisis. A systems dynamic 
approach, which lends itself to group model 
building through intensive, participatory 
consultation with stakeholders and 
representation and refinement of models using 
graphical systems tools, offers an effective 
means of exploring the determinants of systems 
vulnerability and resilience. 
 
The project is implemented by the Mailman 
School of Public Health, Columbia University 
in collaboration with the School of Public 
Health, University of Western Cape.  The work 
is funded by the UK Department of 
International Development (DFID) through the 
ReBUILD program coordinated by the 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh. 
 
A series of three case studies are planned 
during the course of the project. The first, a 
historical analysis, considered measures 
addressing the disruption of HIV services in 
Cote d’Ivoire following the disputed 
presidential election of 20101. This second case 
study focused on circumstances in the health 
sector in Yobe state related, and in response, to 
the Boko Haram insurgency beginning around 
2011 and continuing to the present. The final 
case study will focus on more chronic health 
systems challenges in one district of Eastern 
Cape province in South Africa. 
 
The case study was completed in collaboration 
with the Partnership for Reviving Routine 
Immunization in Northern Nigeria and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lembani, M, de Pinho, H, Delobelle, P. Zarowsky, C. & Ager, A. 
(2014) A case study of technical assistance to HIV services in Cote 
d’Ivoire in the context of civil unrest following the disputed 
Maternal Newborn Child Health (PRRINN-
MNCH) programme. PRRINN-MNCH has 
been operating in Northern Nigeria since 2008 
with support from the UK Department of 
International Development (DFID)  and the 
State Department of the Norwegian 
Government.  
 
The programme aims to improve maternal, 
newborn and child health in Northern Nigeria 
by improving access to maternal and child 
health, including routine immunization 
services, in four States: Jigawa, Katsina, 
Zamfara and Yobe. Of these four states it is the 
latter that has been most significantly impacted 
by the Boko Haram insurgency. It was on this 
basis that Yobe was selected as the geographical 
focus for the case study. The focus of the 
analysis was the impact of the insurgency on 
the health system and the steps taken to 
respond to presented challenges. PRRINN-
MNCH staff assisted in the planning and 
selection of the case study site and 
implementation of the entire study exercise. 
 
YOBE STATE AND THE BOKO HARAM 
INSURGENCY 
 
Yobe State has experienced attacks from the 
militant group popularly known as Boko Haram 
(‘against Western education’) since 2011. 
Initially the group targeted police and 
churches, yet from 2012 the attacks – bombings, 
military raids and robberies - expanded to 
target mosques, schools, hospitals, and banks.  
 
The neighbouring states of Borno and 
Adamawa were similarly affected and a state of 
emergency was declared in these states in May 
2013. The situation created much fear and panic 
among citizens. People left their homes and 
migrated to what were seen as safer locations.  
This significantly disrupted livelihoods as 
people were displaced from their land and 
other places of work. Security concerns and 
travel restrictions imposed by the state severely 
curtailed opportunities for commerce. As the 
insurgency evolved, Boko Haram started   
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burning villages and kidnapping community 
leaders. At the time of writing, Yobe state is 
under a third consecutive six-month state of 
emergency. Many organizations have 
terminated their operations in the state, while 
those who continued working (such as 
PRRINN-MNCH) have done so with key 
activities (such as consultation meetings and 
trainings) conducted outside the state. This has 
increased the costs of programme 
implementation significantly.  
 
 
Map of Nigeria, showing Yobe State. Source: Wikimedia.org  
 
The health system was majorly affected by 
these events. Health workers, especially those 
not indigenous to the state, fled to other states. 
Indigenous workers were generally reported to 
have only temporarily abandoned their work 
places during spikes of insecurity, returning 
when the situation improved.  Some health 
facilities were directly attacked, with insurgents 
taking away drugs, hospital equipment, 
ambulances and other vehicles.  
 
In some instances health workers were 
abducted, while others were killed by blasts 
when traveling to or from work. Some hospitals 
had to be closed for some time until the local 
situation normalized.  Movement for health 
workers and patients to attend health facilities 
was a major challenge due to curfews imposed 
by the security services (the Joint Task Force, 
JTF). Curfews were regularly declared and 
significantly restricted movement. When 
curfews were lifted, delays were frequent 
because of multiple checkpoints mounted on 
the roads. On initial deployment of the JTF, 
with no established relationship between locals 
and the largely non-indigenous security forces, 
harassment was reportedly common, though 
cooperation grew with greater mutual 
familiarity.  
 
Other aspects of counter-insurgency response – 
such as the banning of motorcycles (a favoured 
means of transport for Boko Haram raids), the 
prohibition of the growing of any plant up to 
one meter high (seen to provide cover for 
insurgents) and the interruption of cellphone 
service (to restrict contact between insurgents 
during major anti-insurgency operations) – also 
contributed to a challenging environment for 
the functioning of, and access to, health 
services. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The study was structured according to four 
distinct phases of activity. The first phase was 
focused on the development of a scenario 
definition (defining the bounds of the case 
study) and subsequent interviews with key 
informants. The scenario definition was 
constructed on the basis of preliminary 
planning discussions with key PRRINN-MNCH 
staff, including the National Programme 
Manager, the Deputy National Programme 
Manager and the Yobe State Team Manager.  
 
This confirmed Yobe as the geographical focus 
of the study and primary health care provision 
as the principal service focus of analysis. This 
also informed a structured interview guide 
regarding major challenges faced in the course 
of the insurgency and strategies to address 
them.  
 
Given logistical constraints on interview 
coverage and the varied impact of the 
insurgency in different parts of the state, the 
scenario definition further focused detailed 
analysis on three of Yobe’s seventeen Local 
Government Areas (LGAs). These comprised: 
Damaturu (the location of the state capital, 
which has been both directly – through attacks 
– and indirectly – through migration – 
impacted by the insurgency), Fune (a rural area 
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directly impacted by the insurgency at varying 
times) and Nguru (an area that has experienced 
no direct attacks, but has been indirectly 
impacted through significant inward 
migration).  
 
Thirty-nine interviews were conducted across 
these three LGAs. Interviewees included health 
managers, local government officials, health 
facility personnel and patients.  In addition, 
four PRRINN-MNCH staff were formally 
interviewed: the National Programme 
Manager, the Deputy National Programme 
Manager, the Yobe State Team Manager and the 
Operations Research Coordinator. Thus a total 
of forty-three interview transcripts were 
available to inform the second phase of the 
study.  
 
 
Map of Yobe State LGAs, Nigeria. Source: Newsrescue.com  
 
This second phase involved preliminary data 
analysis and planning. Two members of the 
research team and two PRRINN-MNCH staff 
based in Yobe served as the core planning team. 
Each member of the planning team reviewed all 
transcripts of interviews and then 
independently identified key themes emerging 
from them. The members of the planning team 
then worked together to group themes and 
consolidate them into defined variables.  The 
planning team then developed an 
interrelationship diagraph (IRD) identifying hat 
was suggested – from the data reviewed – to be 
major causal linkages between these variables. 
Informed by the IRD the planning group then 
specified a ‘seed model’ as a starting point for 
model building at the group model building 
(GMB) workshop.  
 
Finally the team developed a series of scripts to 
structure discussion at that workshop. The 
scripts are a detailed description of the 
processes followed during GMB sessions (based 
upon the work of Hovmand 2  and other 
colleagues3).  
 
Core planning team members identify causal links 
 
The third phase involved the GMB workshop 
itself. This was a one-day session for eleven 
participants, identified by the planning team as 
representing key perspectives on the 
functioning of the health systems in Yobe 
during the insurgency.  
 
This included representatives of the State 
Ministry of Health, the State Primary Health 
Care Management Board, and Health Training 
Institutions (HTI); the Medical Director of 
Damaturu Specialist Hospital; a local 
engagement officer who had conducted key 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Hovmand, P.S. Community Based System Dynamics. Springer: 
2013.	  3	  Andersen, D.F. and Richardson G.P. (1997). "Scripts for group 
model building." System Dynamics Review 13(2): 107-129.	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informant interviews; and four senior staff of 
PRRINN-MNCH.  
 
Scripts were used to: elicit a shared 
understanding of key characteristics of the 
insurgency (using a ‘rich picture’ exercise); 
review, confirm, illustrate and elaborate upon 
the listing of variables identified by the 
planning team; link these variables, building 
upon the provided ‘seed model’, by specifying 
two preliminary systems models accounting for 
experience in a specified urban and rural 
location in the state respectively; and 
consolidate these two models into a single 
systems model with the aid of Vensim 
graphical software.4 The GMB session closed 
with a reflection on the insights prompted by 
data to facilitate the quantitative refinement of 
the model. 
 
Phase four of the study involved processes of 
documentation, refinement and dissemination. 
A full transcript of GMB discussions was 
produced, and the data used to elaborate the 
analysis which follows. HMIS data for 
particular locations - Damaturu LGA, Gujba 
LGA (a proxy for Fune LGA, with similar 
insurgency experience) and Nguru LGA - was 
extracted and consolidated. 
 
 
 
Discussion was prompted by a ‘rich picture’ exercise 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Vensim is a free software used for developing, analysing, and 
packaging dynamic feedback models.  
 
STUDY FINDINGS 
 
Fifteen variables were confirmed by GMB 
participants as key in accounting for health 
systems functioning during the crisis. These are 
considered, in turn, below. During the course of 
modeling, an additional twelve variables were 
specified as intervening factors clarifying 
linkages between variables. The linkages 
identified between all these variables are shown 
in Figure 1, the systems model developed by 
participants during the GMB exercise. 
 
Insecurity 
 
Between June 2011 and August 2014 there were 
numerous documented attacks by Boko Haram 
within Yobe state resulting in an estimated 
1,341 fatalities. 5  Incidents peaked in October 
2012, with over 12 reported attacks and 140 
fatalities. There were 252 deaths in Yobe state in 
the first six months of 2014 alone.6 Interviews 
documented many incidents vividly illustrating 
this prevailing insecurity: One health facility 
worker, for example, reported: 
 
“When Dogon Kuka was attacked, people ran away 
and the health facility was closed for almost three 
months. One security guard was killed in his 
house.”  
 
Another health worker told of how one day 
gun shots started when she was in the office 
and there was no way she could move to her 
house easily. All the staff lay on the ground, 
weeping on the bare floor tiles.  
 
Due to such insecurity, many people felt 
compelled to migrate out of their villages, and 
health workers left their workstations for safer 
places. Insecurity also created movement 
challenges, as people were afraid of being 
attacked when traveling because insurgents 
often blocked the roads and attacked people.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Haken, Nate, and Benjamin Kaufman. "State of Emergency in 
Nigeria: Balancing Hard Security with Peacebuilding." Fund for 
Peace. N.p., 29 May 2013. Web. 
6  "Nigeria Security Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. 
Council on Foreign Relations, n.d. Web	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Figure 1: Systems model of factors influencing health utilization and of services quality during the   
insurgency in Yobe developed through group model building  
 
During the GMB session one participant 
reported an incident regarding some health 
workers who were attacked after the prevailing 
6.00pm curfew because they had been called to 
render services at the hospital due to an 
emergency. Even though they had IDs to allow 
them travel during curfew hours, the Nigerian 
police had physically harassed them.  
 
There were a number of reports of the police 
abusing their power through assaults. This 
situation was aggravated when the ‘Escobar’7 
phenomenon was at its peak, since one could 
not differentiate between the official security 
forces and criminal gangs because they were all 
wearing uniforms, carrying guns, and driving 
HILUX vehicles. Such incidents were reported 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  ‘Escobar’ was the nickname of leader of a Damaturu-based 
criminal gang. They undertook their activities using military 
uniforms. He was subsequently apprehended and killed by 
security agents. 
to have been at their peak during 2012 and 
2013.   
 
Migration of people  
 
As the bombings, abductions and killings 
became wider and more indiscriminate in their 
scope, increasing numbers of people relocated 
to what were perceived to be safer areas. When 
attacks were concentrated on urban settings, 
migration was to rural areas. When urban 
centers such as Damaturu became more secure, 
attacks shifted to more rural areas, and 
migration was towards the towns. For example, 
one of the interviewees in Damaturu reported:  
 
“That time around, the patients have even migrated 
and left the town because it is our catchment area. 
Damaturu that was affected by the activities of the 
insurgents more especially in Gwange area of 
Damaturu local government.” 
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A participant of the GMB expressed similar 
sentiments and stated that in the beginning the 
attacks were concentrated in Damaturu and 
people were moving from Damaturu to various 
places. However the situation changed when 
Damaturu was heavily secured by armed 
forces, the insurgents turned to the rural areas, 
and the migration patterns reversed. 
 
Migration of health workers 
 
Health workers were not spared in the killings 
and threats. Indigenous workers generally 
abandoned their workplace temporarily and 
returned whenever the situation calmed down. 
However, most non-indigenous workers left 
permanently. Records gathered from the Yobe 
state HRIS indicate that the most affected 
cadres of staff were doctors and 
nurses/midwives as compared to other staff as 
presented in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
With the exception of Gujba LGA, Table 1 
indicates that the number of health workers in 
other cadres had increased in 2014 compared to 
2010, which is an indication of a higher 
retention during the crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Number of health workers other than 
doctors and nurses/midwives in 2010 and 2014 
by LGA [Source: Compiled from Yobe state HRIS data] 
 
However, figures in Table 2 indicate a 
significant decline in the number of doctors and 
professional nurses/midwives across each of 
the three LGAs over the same period. For 
example, the general hospital in Buni Yadi lost 
all its three doctors it had in 2010 and there was 
no doctor left at the hospital by June 2014. The 
general hospital at Potiskum lost about 90% of 
its doctors over the same period. Only Sani 
Abatcha State Specialist hospital seemed to 
have significantly fared better, losing only 30% 
of its physicians. 2014 figures are likely to 
reflect an upward trend from 2013 when the 
State Governor lifted an embargo on 
recruitment in recognition of the acute 
shortages that had arisen (HRIS data is not 
available for intervening years). Participants in 
the GMB stated that more doctors are arriving 
and picking up jobs in hospitals now, hence the 
increase.  
 
The trend for professional nurses/midwives is 
similar. For instance, Sani Abatcha Specialist 
Hospital lost 75% of its professional 
nurses/midwives while the general hospital in 
Potiskum lost about 70% of this cadre. Only 
General Hospital Buni Yadi fared better, losing 
only about 25% of such staff.  Midwives were 
especially affected because most of them were 
from other states deployed through the 
Midwives Service Scheme (MSS) and almost all 
of them left the state at some point. 
   
 
Table 2: Number of doctors and nurses/ 
midwives in post in 2010 and 2014 [Source: 
Compiled from Yobe state HRIS data]  
 
Key informants confirmed that during the 
crisis, most health workers did not want to stay 
in Yobe state. One participant at the GMB 
stated: 
 
“In the hostel, a lot of medical doctors left, the 
National Youth Service Corps (NYSCs) do not come 
to Yobe at all, not even Damaturu. A lot of non-
indigenes left, a lot of indigenes who are outside 
Yobe couldn’t come. But now it has been reversed. 
There were only four NYSCs who reported initially 
but now there are sixteen.”  
 
 
Name of LGA 
 
2010 
 
2014 
Gujba LGA 529 
 
292 
Damaturu LGA 468 583 
Potiskum  368 450  
Hospital (LGA) 
Dr. Nurse/Mvs 
2010 2014 2010 2014 
General Hospital 
Buni Yadi 
(Gujba) 
3 0 33 25 
Sani Abatcha 
State Specialist 
Hospital 
(Damaturu) 
24 17 107 27 
General Hospital 
Potiskum 
(Potiskum) 
11 1 86 26 
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The participants reported that more NYSCs 
were currently coming to take up posts in Yobe 
state.  
 
Movement challenges/restrictions  
 
The many dangerous roads where insurgents 
could mount ambushes presented significant 
challenges regarding movement within the 
state. However, counter-insurgency measures 
also led to major travel restrictions. Curfews 
were sometimes set to begin as early as 4 pm, 
creating major logistical travel difficulties. At 
times the JTF blocked roads were considered 
too dangerous for people to travel on.  
Diversions, significantly adding to journey 
times, would generally be provided, but on 
occasions no alternative routes were available, 
preventing all travel. Although some categories 
of health staff were provided with IDs to ease 
movements, there were still some challenges. 
One participant noted:  
 
“The ‘Road Pass’ helps most times but still 
sometimes it wouldn’t because it seems one is 
exposing himself and you don’t know who else is 
watching, even the security. It may come across like 
a particular person thinks he is special and they may 
follow you and attack you. So at times you may have 
the pass and may not want to use it.”  
 
Another participant added to this experience 
stating:  
 
“Sometimes you have to bring your stethoscope out 
of your car. Some of us have a ‘Road Pass’ to enable 
us pass the queue but it does not prevent a search. 
When there is high tension, when you go and meet 
the security officer, they don’t understand but some 
of them that understand may agree to search you 
and let you go.” 
 
Supplies of drugs and consumables 
 
GMB participants confirmed the view emerging 
from stakeholder interviews that availability of 
drugs and other consumables at facilities was, 
in general, not severely disrupted by the 
insurgency. The State Ministry of Health and 
facility managers minimized stock outs by  
 
changing deliveries from the usual one-month 
supply to a three-month supply.  
 
Additionally, facilities were encouraged to 
order new stocks when they had 50% of the 
drug stocks remaining. In the context of mass 
casualty events some short-term drug stock-
outs were reported, but restocking was secured 
swiftly. The decentralized nature of the drug 
supply chain – with drugs managed at the state 
- rather than federal level - made it much easier 
to transport drugs to and from the Damaturu 
drug store whenever transport routes were 
secure. Flexibility in local supply routes helped 
secure supplies when circumstances were 
volatile.  
 
The GMB participants and key informant 
interviewees both reported drugs being 
brought somewhere close to a facility for 
collection by facility personnel once access was 
possible. There was some evidence of 
commercial drug supplies being more severely 
impacted due to transport difficulties and loss 
of consumer’s purchasing power. One local 
drug vendor reported that to get a lorry to take 
their drugs to Damaturu sometimes took up to 
two weeks. Even when they got the transport, 
the price was double because the drivers didn’t 
want to go to Damaturu due to the insecurity. 
Another supplier reported:  
 
“I used to sell an average of 30,000 Naira per day 
but with the insurgency, I could only sell about 
10,000 Naira a whole week.”  
 
Physical access to health services 
 
Physical accessibility of health facilities was one 
of the most important factors influencing 
patient utilization of health services. 
Interviewed patients stated that during the 
critical periods of the insurgency, it was 
extremely difficult to get to a health facility due 
to travel restrictions and fear of being attacked.   
 
One patient noted:  
 
“…as you know, we can’t come to hospital easily 
because of their activities ….people have suffered a  
9	  	  
 
lot because of the insecurity, even if you are not well 
and you want to come to the hospital it is a big 
problem…..if you intend to go to the hospital you are 
thinking of what is going to happen to you on the 
way.”  
 
Some pregnant women were reported to have 
died as a result of complications during 
delivery due to failure or delay in accessing 
health facility care. One of the participants in 
the GMB session testified about his close friend 
whose wife died in labour at home because she 
could not be taken to the hospital due to travel 
challenges.  
 
At some point, arrangements were made with 
the JTF for security personnel to collect patients 
from their homes and escort them to the health 
facilities when contacted through a medical 
emergency telephone number. Unfortunately, 
this service had later to be discontinued after 
insurgents feigned illness and then ambushed 
the military forces coming to attend them. This 
had resulted in an arrangement where those 
telephoning the emergency number and 
providing a description of their vehicle are 
allowed to use their own cars to access a health 
facility during curfew hours. The JTF then 
monitored the passage of the vehicle from a 
position of cover.  
 
Financial barriers  
 
Movement restrictions have limited people’s 
access to gainful activities, hampering their 
financial capacities. People could not trade their 
commodities for fear of attacks. From the early 
months of the insurgency, farming of certain 
crops such as maize was banned so that 
insurgents could not use those fields as cover to 
launch their attacks. Also, due to curfews and 
direct attacks, banks were only open for a short 
period of time and some were completely 
closed. There were even restrictions on 
interbank transfers. Even those who had money 
in their bank accounts could not easily access 
this money to transact business. 
 
A number of interviewees noted that the 
financial barriers to service access during the  
 
insurgency were, however, significantly less 
than they would have been without the 
introduction in 2009 of a state drug subsidy 
scheme. This ensures that all pregnant women 
and children under-five had access to free 
drugs. All drugs and materials required to treat 
a medical emergency – such as a shooting or 
bombing – are also covered. These 
arrangements, and the separate ‘free MNCH’ 
programme operating in some facilities, thus 
moderated the health impact of the disruption 
of livelihoods resulting from the insurgency.  
 
Utilization of services 
 
Interviews suggested that the level of security 
influenced the use of services in a complex 
manner. If the number of attacks was high in a 
particular area, the utilization of services was 
low because patients were afraid to travel to the 
health facilities.  
 
A medical doctor from one of the most affected 
areas stated that most patients that came to seek 
care did so when they were critically ill and 
required urgent medical attention. Patients who 
were not severely sick would defer or decline 
attendance due to insecurity. Mothers who had 
appointments for routine immunization, for 
example, often missed their appointments.  
 
However, if an attack involved large numbers 
of casualties then health facilities nearby would 
be filled with patients injured during an attack. 
Areas that experienced fewer or no attacks 
reported a general increase in patient 
attendance because people had migrated to 
those places.    
 
HMIS data on facility attendance confirmed 
great fluctuations due to insurgency activities 
and related counter-insurgency measures. For 
example, Damaturu has at times been a major 
focus of attacks, but through counter-
insurgency measures has at other times been 
seen as a relatively safe haven from attacks. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this pattern of varying 
patient attendance for the three LGAs for which 
HMIS data was reviewed.  
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Figure 2 presents trends in total number of 
facility deliveries per quarter in three LGAs 
from January 2012 to June 2014. The pattern 
indicates that whenever there was a decrease in 
facility deliveries in Damaturu, there was a 
corresponding increase of facility deliveries in 
Nguru. For example, during the quarter July to 
September 2012, the number of facility attended 
deliveries in Damaturu declined to 21 deliveries 
from 797 in the previous quarter, while in 
Nguru the numbers increased to 835 deliveries 
against 111 deliveries over the same period. By  
April to June 2013 Damaturu had experienced a 
sharp increase in facility deliveries while in 
Nguru the numbers reduced to previous levels. 
By late 2013 the pattern had reversed again, 
with deliveries in Damaturu steeply declining 
and those in Nguru rising again. Attended 
deliveries in Gujba were relatively stable – with 
some fluctuation – during this period. 
 
Similarly, Figure 3 shows total recorded facility 
attendance across LGAs from April 2013 to June  
2014. Reporting from facilities was not 
complete during this period, so reported rates 
are assumed to be an underestimate of total 
attendance. However, with comparable 
reporting rates across the three LGAs 
comparison of trends across the different 
settings is likely valid. 
 
This data suggests a marked increase in service 
utilization in Nguru during the course of 2013 
(in line with the increase in attended deliveries 
during this period). With no reported insurgent 
attacks in Nguru, this appears to reflect internal 
migration within the state to an area perceived 
as safe during a period of major insecurity 
elsewhere. 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Nigeria HMIS data 
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Health worker workload 
 
As most non-indigenous health workers left 
Yobe state, fewer health workers were left 
to attend to patients. For example, as noted 
earlier, the number of nurses/midwives at 
the specialist hospital in Damaturu dropped 
from 107 in 2010 before the insurgency to 27 
during the insurgency period in early 2014.  
 
Increased patient numbers at times of 
inward migration or mass casualty 
incidents exacerbated the impact of this on 
workload. For instance, through November 
and December 2011, Damaturu experienced 
a number of intense attacks where over 100 
people were killed, each resulting in many 
casualties requiring urgent treatment. With 
increased workload the quality of services 
was compromised because the few available 
staff could not effectively attend to all the 
patients. Interviews documented reports of 
patient deaths in the hospital attributed to 
delays in treatment due to inadequate 
staffing levels. One nurse noted:  
 
“I am a nurse by profession, so I have 
restrictions, I am not supposed to be clerking 
patients, but when they meet me, I have to step 
out to do the function of a medical officer and 
also nursing work, which as a human being is 
demoralizing (demotivating). The pressure on 
me will definitely undermine efficiency.”  
 
Pressure on health infrastructure 
 
Increased utilization of services at facilities 
also created pressure on health 
infrastructure. Bed space was frequently 
inadequate when patient attendance 
increased beyond planned health facility 
capacity. Mortuary capacity was reported to 
have frequently been inadequate for the 
demand following mass casualty incidents. 
Hospitals had to ask the environmental 
department to assist in clearing away the 
dead bodies. Pressure on health 
infrastructure was so severe that it  
prompted the state governor to intervene to 
release funds to construct more mortuaries 
and extend hospital wards. 
 
Liaison with security services 
 
Liaison with security forces was key during 
the crisis to enable essential movement of 
health workers during curfew hours. 
Doctors were sometimes called to go to the 
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hospital and help with emergencies but due 
to curfews they would be restricted in their 
movement. The Ministry of Health made 
arrangements with the JTF to allow health 
workers to go to work during curfew hours 
through prior arrangement with local 
security forces.  
 
This was subsequently facilitated by the 
provision of identity cards to show to the 
security personnel when crossing 
checkpoints. However, health workers 
reported sometimes being reluctant to show 
IDs for fear that this exposed their identity 
to potential insurgents who on occasions 
targeted killings of government personnel. 
 
Community members also liaised with 
security forces whenever they needed to 
transport a sick person to the hospital or, 
more generally, if they wanted to report 
information about insurgents in their 
community. However, those seen talking to 
security forces were considered a direct 
target of insurgents, with one participant in 
the GMB session claiming: 
 
“If they see you with the JTF number in your 
cellphone or you are talking to a security officer, 
you are dead.”  
 
State officials would also regularly liaise 
with security forces to seek to reduce 
curfew hours to enable citizens to move 
around more freely and go about their 
business.  
 
Duty shift patterns and task shifting 
 
The restrictions in movement due to 
curfews created challenges in the duty shift 
of health workers who were scheduled to 
travel to work at restricted times. To resolve 
this challenge, the Hospitals Management 
Board convened senior physicians and 
nurses and made a formal change to the 
health worker duty shifts. Instead of three 
eight-hour shifts, two twelve-hour shifts 
were established. This ensured continuity of 
staffing at facilities in a manner achievable 
with curfew restrictions.   
 
Other less formal adjustments to working 
practices were also reported. In the context 
of the crisis, health workers were reported 
to have assumed duties for which they were 
not fully trained and licensed – a form of 
informal task-shifting. Such flexibility in 
role allocations was widely perceived as a 
necessity in the context of the prevailing 
crisis, and a move that has demonstrated 
the significant capability of less senior 
cadres.  
 
Financial support 
 
As a result of the crisis the health sector 
required additional financial support to 
address the increased demand for health 
services because of casualties.  As noted 
earlier, the State government was already 
funding free drug programmes for specific 
groups before the insurgency, and this 
arrangement extended to covering the costs 
of those attending for emergency 
intervention following insurgent attacks.  
 
Given State responsibilities for funding 
contributions to the JTF security operation, 
Yobe state budgets for all sectors – 
including health – were put under severe 
pressure. Longer term development projects 
(e.g. health facility construction) were 
postponed, but generally finance for the 
health sector was robustly supported. In 
2013 the health sector absorbed 97.3% of its 
allocated budget, which represented a 
budgetary allocation double of that 
allocated for the health sector in 2011 when 
the crisis had just begun (and of which only 
60% had ultimately been disbursed).  
 
Political will  
 
Stakeholders attributed financial support to 
the political will exhibited by the State 
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Governor. His visits to hospitals and other 
facilities in the aftermath of major attacks 
were clearly appreciated. One participant at 
the GBM session noted  
 
“Actually, the renovation to some extent was 
triggered by the insurgency. The Governor was 
not even happy about the capacity of the 
infrastructure and that is why he declared a 
State of emergency on the health sector. I 
remember when the Governor had been around 
more than ten times which is unprecedented. He 
comes at will, without being announced just to 
see everything that he needs to see and for some 
years back sometimes it is hard to see the 
Governor.”  
 
Additionally the state provided security 
personnel in the cities and also facilitated 
removal of some of the roadblocks to 
support movement. More specifically to the 
health sector, on appreciating the loss of 
capacity in the health workforce with the 
loss of non-indigenous staff, the state 
sanctioned the lifting of an established 
embargo on employment to the health 
sector. Further, the state provided 
incentives to health workers such as 
offering furnished houses and ensuring 
regular and on-time salary payment, which 
was generally secured despite all the 
challenges with the banking system. 
  
Community resources/cohesion 
 
Community support was regarded as a key 
factor that helped community members to 
cope during the crisis. This involved 
providing spiritual, emotional, and social 
support to each other. Most of the 
interviewees mentioned that they survived 
by faith and through prayers, indicating 
that religion played a major role in holding 
the people together, giving them hope to go 
on and endure the crisis and its suffering.  
Community members organized transport 
for those who needed to access health 
facility services, and provided shelter to 
those who had abandoned their homes due 
to insecurity.  
 
Community members were also a source of 
information regarding the insurgents. They 
would alert the health workers not to 
conduct activities, especially immunization 
campaigns, whenever the insurgents were 
operating within, or close by, their local 
area. Many interviewees and GMB 
participants shared examples of such 
sharing of information, and how trust 
between communities and the JTF was 
gradually established. One participant 
recounted:  
 
“A small boy who came from a family of 10 
people was the only child remaining with his 
mother. He had seen soldiers kill his father and 
his other family members and he was bitter. 
Unfortunately these were insurgents but 
disguised as security personnel. One day the 
child asked his mother for 50 Naira to buy some 
sweets but instead he took that money to the 
security personnel and asked them to sell him a 
gun, which one of the soldiers had in his hands. 
When asked why, he replied that he wanted to 
kill all the soldiers in his area.  The soldiers then 
took the child to the mother who explained what 
had happened. It was only then that the soldiers 
realized that the insurgents had been disguising 
themselves as if they were security personnel 
and were going around killing people.” 
 
 
Key linkages and drivers 
 
Figure 1 shows how these different factors 
were seen to relate to each other in the 
consolidated systems model developed by 
participants at the GMB session. For 
example, as a result of health worker 
migration, there was reduced availability of 
health workers hence leading to increased 
health worker workload, which decreased 
staff commitment and motivation and in 
turn negatively affected the quality of care. 
As quality of health care declined, 
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pressure/complaints from community 
members increased, which created political 
will to act on the situation. Due to increased 
political will, there was recruitment of staff, 
which increased availability of health 
workers thereby reducing health worker 
workload.  
 
The systems model clearly identifies 
insecurity as the major driver of threat to 
service utilization and quality. Two major 
drivers of response to such threat which 
were identified were political will, and 
community resources and cohesion. Both of 
these factors are discussed above, and are 
essentially external to the health system, but 
supporting functions within it. A third 
major driver of response to the challenges 
created by insecurity was identified as an 
important construct in the course of model 
building: health worker commitment and 
motivation. This factor, internal to the 
health system (but linked to demands on 
workers from outside the system) was seen 
to have contributed significantly to service 
access and quality.  
 
Interviews and discussion generally 
indicated that commitment was generally 
high among the health workers remaining 
in post through the insurgency. Health 
workers reported encountering many 
challenges but this was generally reported 
to have not deterred them from providing 
services to the patients, although they 
worked under fear. Most of the facility in-
charge persons reported that they used to 
encourage and motivate their staff to ensure 
their availability at the facility and this 
helped the health facilities to cope during 
the crisis period. One facility in-charge 
reported:  
“Since I am in-charge of the facility, I don’t 
think there was any time I did not come to work 
and I always organized my staff to come to 
work.”  
 
Patients who were interviewed backed up 
these assertions. They also reported on the 
level of commitment with which the health 
workers operated as stated by one patient:  
 
“Thank God the truth is that the health workers 
are trying their best to provide quality services.”  
 
Another patient reported, 
 
“The quality of service is good always and we 
find the health workers there…before the 
insurgency the number of health workers were 
more than now but they are trying, even now.”  
 
Although there were aspects of good 
performance in some facilities, a few health 
workers reported of some cases of patients 
that came and could not be fully attended to 
due to limited availability of staff and of the 
capacity to perform certain procedures. 
Some patients were reported to have ended 
up dying right at the health facility due to 
the limited attention they got from health 
workers. 
 
Discussion 
 
The central goal of the Health Systems 
Resilience project is to understand, in 
systems terms, what characterizes health 
systems resilience in the contexts of crisis. 
This involves understanding both what 
constitutes the greatest threats to the 
operation of health provision in times of 
crisis, and also what represents effective 
response to address such threats. 
 
In the context of Yobe State health services 
during the Boko Haram insurgency, it is 
clear that prevailing insecurity has been the 
major driver of threats to health service 
utilization and quality. Figure 4 is a refined 
systems model reflecting analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative data by the 
modelling team subsequent to the GMB 
session. 
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Figure 4: Systems model developed by stakeholders in Yobe and refined to show key pathways 
of threat and response 
 
The blue and the purple pathways 
highlighted indicate the two major routes 
by which insecurity impacted service 
utilization and quality. The former pathway 
shows the influence on health service 
utilization and quality principally through 
restricting access to health services, either 
directly through transport difficulties or 
indirectly as a result of population 
displacement. The latter pathway shows the 
impact of insecurity through depletion of 
the human resources available to the health 
system, reflecting loss of personnel and loss 
of technical assistance to support personnel. 
 
Without any actions in response to these 
threats, health service utilization and 
quality would have been severely reduced. 
However, three major sources of response 
are identified in the systems analysis. First, 
political will on the part of State 
Government and other parties reinforced a 
number of pathways (marked in red in 
Figure 4) ameliorating systems impacts of 
insecurity. These included direct attempts 
to normalize conditions through liaison 
with the JTF, efforts to bolster human 
resources capability (through lifting the 
recruitment moratorium and ensuring 
prompt remuneration for health workers), 
and pre-existing commitments to free-drug 
supply. While the former two pathways 
were responsive to the impacts of the crisis, 
the latter was a pathway that was widely 
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seen as pre-emptive of greater threats to 
health service provision through the 
insurgency (a true basis of systems 
resilience). 
 
Community resources and cohesion was 
identified as another source of pathways of 
influence mitigating the impacts of the crisis 
(shown in pink in Figure 4). The community 
was drawn together over time to liaise with 
the security services, which reduced fear 
and anxiety and their negative impacts. 
Communities pooled resources (knowledge, 
transport and finance) to enable physical 
and financial access to health facilities for 
those in need. Communities were also seen 
to have played a key role in mobilizing 
political will, though concerted advocacy in 
relation to the fragility of health provision 
in the wake of the insurgency.  
 
The other key pathways promoting systems 
resilience in the context of the ongoing crisis 
stem from staff commitment and motivation 
(shown in orange in Figure 4). Although 
this is difficult to objectively quantify, 
interviews and discussion repeatedly noted 
the strong commitment of indigenous 
health workers and its protective influence. 
This operated through an acceptance of a 
challenging shift pattern that 
accommodated to the prevailing curfew and 
taking on additional responsibilities 
through informal task-shifting, as well as 
more direct influence on quality of care. 
 
Two other areas of Figure 4 warrant 
discussion. The flow of information from 
and to security services (shown in grey) was 
a core dynamic underpinning health 
systems response to the insurgency. This 
flow was considered to be very restricted on 
initial deployment of the JTF, when a lack of 
community awareness amongst a security 
force largely drawn from out-of-state 
created significant tensions. However, as 
awareness increased, so did trust and 
information flow, which was crucial to the 
passage of health personnel, patients and 
commodities. Coordination between the 
State Ministry of Health and security forces 
enabled health workers to be cleared faster 
at check-points after identifying themselves 
with special IDs.  
 
The JTF also provided security escorts to 
patients in emergencies, before insurgents 
hijacked the arrangement. In addition to 
such formal mechanisms, community health 
workers reported tremendous coordination 
with community members who warned 
health workers when it was not safe for 
them to visit specific communities, for 
example, for immunization activities. 
 
Finally, the supply of drugs and 
consumables and financial barriers and 
their linkage to travel and utilization are not 
emphasized as major pathways in Figure 4 
as interviews and GMB discussion 
confirmed that these had not been 
significant variables during the course of 
the insurgency. However, as noted earlier in 
this discussion, this may be seen as 
evidence of true resilience in the context of 
the Yobe health system: the prevailing 
decentralized ’push’ drug supply approach 
– supported by good state storage capacity 
in Damaturu – and the free drug supply 
policies introduced before the crisis both 
served to protect key functional capacities 
of the system. 
 
LESSONS LEARNT 
 
The final session of the GMB exercise 
focused on identification of lessons learned 
from the crisis that could inform those in 
other contexts facing similar challenges.  
 
Principal amongst the lessons identified by 
participants was the importance for people 
to understand the security situation 
through liaison with security forces. This 
was seen as crucial to ensure that decisions 
regarding movements were always well 
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informed. Some suggested that it is 
necessary for organizations to have security 
protocols and guidelines in place in 
advance in order to manage such situations.  
 
Ensuring adequate human resource 
availability was another key lesson. This 
was seen to be best secured by (a) 
employing indigenous health workers to 
minimize migration during times of crisis 
(b) providing secure accommodation and 
regular salary payment and (c) increasing 
in-house training of health workers, to 
reduce dependence on external resources 
vulnerable during periods of instability.  
 
Another lesson included the need to secure 
uninterrupted funding to the health sector. 
This had been considered a significant risk 
within the state due to pressures on public 
finances with the insurgency and 
deployment of security services. Political 
will in support of the health sector – and the 
community advocacy for it to be retained – 
was seen as crucial in this regard.  
 
Increasing supply of drugs and consumables 
in order to overcome travel difficulties and 
restrictions was regarded as a major 
logistical lesson that had generally been 
managed well within the state.  Health 
facilities receiving three-months drug 
supplies instead of the regular one-month 
supply appeared to have minimized drug 
stock outs. Other lessons identified by 
participants included:  
 
• focusing implementation on a few 
critical services that are achievable 
rather than doing everything with little 
impact 
• focusing on the primary health care 
package and bringing the services closer 
to the communities for ease of access 
• involving communities and traditional 
leaders and letting people’s voice be 
heard in order to fully utilize the social, 
moral, and religious resources available 
by such means 
• developing a culture of good and 
effective communication at all levels 
• identify new methods of delivering 
services (for example, there had been 
some innovation in delivery 
mechanisms for maternal and child 
services in response to the logistical and 
security constraints imposed by the 
insurgency)  
 
 
NEXT STEPS 
 
As noted earlier, this is one of three case 
studies planned with the Health Systems 
Resilience project. Findings across the three 
settings are to be compared to identify 
potentially common systems characteristics 
of resilience. For example, findings in the 
current study regarding the value of 
flexibility in drug supplies and informal 
task-shifting reinforce findings in a 
previous case study focused on HIV service 
delivery in Cote d’Ivoire’s disputed 
Presidential election of 2010. 
 
Such commonalities are to be considered at 
a multi-country, multi-stakeholder meeting 
to be held following the Health Systems 
Global meeting in Cape Town in October 
2014. A synthesis report is planned for the 
first quarter of 2015 
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• Yobe State has faced severe disruption 
of its health service as a result of the 
Boko Haram insurgency 
• Population migration and transport 
restrictions have severely impacted 
access to health provision 
• The human resource for health 
capability of the state has been 
severely diminished through the 
outward migration of (especially non-
indigenous) health workers and the 
suspension of programmes providing 
external technical assistance 
• The political will of the Yobe State 
government to strengthen health 
provision – through lifting a 
moratorium on recruitment and 
providing incentives for retention and 
support of staff – has supported a 
recovery of health systems functioning 
• Policies of free-drug provision and 
decentralized drug supply appear to 
have been protective of the operation 
of the health system 
• Community resources and cohesion 
have been significant assets in 
combatting the impacts of the 
insurgency on service utilization and 
quality 
• Staff commitment and motivation – 
particularly amongst staff indigenous 
to the state – has protected health care 
quality and enabled flexibility of 
human resource deployment 
• Systems modelling provided a 
mechanism to enable stakeholders to 
articulate a vivid picture of the 
interplay of key factors seen to 
influence response to the crisis 
• The methodology adopted appears 
promising for consolidating insights 
from multiple stakeholders regarding 
factors supporting – or undermining -  
health systems resilience 	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